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on interstate commerce, a field over which the federal power is exclusive
because matters concerned are national in scope. The rationale as to federal
police power is not that the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Ashurst-Sumners Act
divested liquor and convict made goods of their interstate character, but
rather that the Supreme Court 2 5 extended the legitimate scope of federal
legislation regulating interstate commerce so that this particular federal police
power operates constitutionally on goods which are harmless in themselves,
harmless in their use, and harmless in the purpose of their transportation.
2 6
This is a new field, because the Child Labor decision 2 7 has always been thought
to stand squarely in the path of such federal control.
It seems that the federal government has always had this police power,
but the court has refused to allow the federal government to exercise it as to
harmless goods, because the court could not find a social interest similar to
those interests protected in the diseased cattle 2 8 and lottery2 9 cases to justify
its use. In the instant case the court has recognized the social interest in the
protection of individual life and welfare in industry as a social interest that
will satisfy the due process requirement. The influx of goods made by cheap
convict labor interferes with this social interest, and so the court permits
Congress to deal with the evil through its interstate commerce power.0
E. A. M.
MORTGAGES-RELEASE-PRIORITIES.-In 1915, the mortgagor gave appellee a
mortgage on certain land to secure a purchase-money note. In May, 1919,
the mortgagor executed a mortgage on the same land to appellant as security
for a promissory note given for a pre-existing indebtedness. Both mortgages
were duly recorded at those respective times. In August, 1919, the mortgagor
gave appellee a new mortgage on the same land to secure a renewal note.
This mortgage was recorded, and contemporaneously therewith the mortgage
of 1915 was released of record. In 1921, the mortgagor gave appellee a new
mortgage on the same land to secure a second renewal note. This mortgage
was duly recorded, and contemporaneously therewith the mortgage of August,
1919 was released of record. Appellee brought suit on his note and to foreclose
the mortgage. Appellant filed a cross-complaint upon his promissory note and
25 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co. (1917), 242 U. S. 311,
37 S. Ct. 180. Kentucky WhSp and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937),
57 S. Ct. 277.
26 Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States, pages 300-303.
27 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1917), 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
28 Reid v. Colorado (1902), 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92.
29 Champion v. Ames (1903), 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321.
3OBut see Baldwin v. Seelig (1935), 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, as a case
where the Supreme Court refused to recognize the social interest in the welfare
of local industry as a valid reason for the exercise of state police power. The
court said that all state regulations enacted with the purpose, and having the
effect of supressing extrastate competition are unconstitutional, regardless of
the incidence of the regulation. See also 3 Univ. of Chicago L. R. 556.
Sl For notes on the decisions of the district court [12F Supp. 37, and of the
circuit court of appeals 84 F (2d) 168] in the case of Ky. Whip and Collar Co.
v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. See 49 Harvard L. R. 466, 13 New York University L. Q.
Rev. 287, 26 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 765, 21 Cornell
L. Q. 357.
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to foreclose his mortgage. The question presented was as to which mortgage
was to be given priority. Held, for appellee.1
There is no dispute among the cases that equity may restore the lien of
a renewal mortgage to its original position of priority over intervening liens
when the old mortgage has been released of record and the new mortgage
contemporaneously recorded. Equity will look to the circumstances of the
transaction and, without regard for the form, will consider the new mortgage
a mere continuation of the lien of the original mortgage as security for the
same debt.2 But it must be in fact a continuation of the security for the old
debt; for if the court finds that a new note and mortgage have been taken
in satisfaction and payment of the old note and mortgage, intervening liens
will then be held to be prior in time as well as of record.3 Thus, this question
of fact-the intent of the parties-must be determined in every case that
arises on the subject.
The appellant, in the instant case, evidently thought that the court should
determine the further question as to whether or not the appellee had knowledge
of the intervening lien at the time he released his original mortgage of record;
for the appellant objected to the authorities cited by the court on the ground
that they did not discuss the question of knowledge or lack of knowledge.
Of course, if the original mortgagee is seeking to have the priority of his
lien restored on the ground that he released his original mortgage as a result
of fraud or misrepresentations of the mortgagor or of his own mistake of
fact as to the existence of another lien, the question of knowledge would
necessarily be in issue.4 Or, even if a case did not involve any of the above
elements, the fact that an original mortgagee released his mortgage with
knowledge of intervening liens might give rise to a presumption that the
parties intended the transaction to be in satisfaction and payment of the
original debt and mortgage; and if evidence were not given to prove a
contrary intent, this question of knowledge would then control the decision
of the case.5
Although there has not been a very satisfactory decision upon the matter,
it would seem that in the absence of any of the things referred to above the
question of knowledge should be immaterial. The transaction wherein the
mortgagee records a new mortgage and releases the old mortgage does not
constitute a payment of the debt which the old mortgage secured unless the
parties intend thereby to create a new debt; and equitable relief should be
given on this ground, without regard to the mortgagee's knowledge of inter-
vening lienholder as a result of the transaction, there is no equitable reason
for giving him the benefit of a windfall at the expense of the original mort-
1 Farmers & First Nat. Bank of New Castle v. Citizens State Bank of New
Castle (Ind., 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 506.
2 Cherry v. Welsher (1923), 195 Iowa 640, 192 N. W 149; Cansler v.
Sallis (1877), 54 Miss. 446.
3 Workingman's Bldg. & Savings Ass'n. v. Williams (Tenn., 1896), 37 S. W
1019; Travers v. Stevens (1933), 108 Fla. 11, 145 So. 851.
4 Sidener v. Pavey (1881), 77 Ind. 241; Bormann v. Hatfield (1917), 96
Wash. 270, 164 P. 921; Island Pond Nat. Bank v. Lacroix (1932), 104 Vt. 282,
158 A. 684. A
G New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Hirsch (1892), 96 Ala. 232, 11
So. 63.
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gagee.O However, the rule should be strictly applied, and if the new mortgage
is given to secure a different debt from the old, 7 or an additional debt,8 or
if the transaction actually prejudices intervening lienholders,9 equitable relief
should be denied the original mortgagee. One thing further must be said.
Innocent third persons will always be protected, and if their rights have
intervened, equity will deny the above relief in so far as it would impinge
upon those rights.1 O
The instant case did not involve any intervention by innocent third persons.
It was established that the appellee and the mortgagor intended their trans-
action to be nothing more than a continuation of the original lien. And the
appellant, as intervening lienholder, has not shown himself to have been
prejudiced in any way as a result of the transaction. Therefore, the decision
of the court in holding appellee's lien to be superior seems eminently correct.1 1
R. H. N.
0Cherry v. Welsher (1923), 195 Iowa 640, 192 N. W 149; Shanks v.
Phillips (1932), 165 Tenn. 401, 55 S. W (2d) 258, Higman v. Humes (1900),
127 Ala. 404, 30 So. 733.7 See note (3) supra.
8 Lomas & N. Co. v. Isacs (1924), 101 Conn. 614, 127 A. 6, Bank of Oakman
v. Thompson (1932), 224 Ala. 87, 139 So. 238.
9 Foster v. Whitenton (1923), 96 Okla. 187, 221 P 52.
lo Etzler v. Evans (1878), 61 Ind. 56, Burton v. Reagan (1881), 75 Ind. 77,
Smith v. Lowry (1887), 113 Ind. 37, 15 N. E. 17, Wells v. Huffman (1919), 69
Ind. App. 379, 121 N. E. 840.
11 See generally- Hirleman v. Nickels (Minn., 1934), 258 N. W 13, Union
Loan & Savings Ass'n. v. Simmons (Neb., 1936), 267 N. W 449; Sullivan v.
Williams (1923), 210 Ala. 363, 98 So. 186, Kellogg Bros. Lumber Co. v. Mular-
key (Wis., 1934), 252 N. W 596, Prairie State Bank v. S. J. Safford & Son
(1934), 140 Kan. 339, 36 P (2d) 1015, Walters v. Walters (1881), 73 Ind. 425,
Pouder v. Ritzinger (1889), 119 Ind. 597, 20 N. E. 654, Hanlon v. Doherty
(1886), 109 Ind. 37, 9 N. E. 782; 33 A. L. R. 149; 98 A. L. R. 843.
